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Abstract
In this paper we present a kinetic model with stochastic game-type
interactions, analyzing the relationship between the level of political
competition in a society and the degree of economic liberalization. The
above issue regards the complex interactions between economy and in-
stitutional policies intended to introduce technological innovations in a
society, where technological innovations are intended in a broad sense
comprehending reforms critical to production [1]. A special focus is
placed on the political replacement effect described in a macroscopic
model by Acemoglu and Robinson (AR-model [3], henceforth), which
can determine the phenomenon of innovation ’blocking’, possibly lead-
ing to economic backwardness. One of the goals of our modelization is
to obtain a mesoscopic dynamical model whose macroscopic outputs
are qualitatively comparable with stylized facts of the AR-model. A
set of numerical solutions is presented showing the non monotonous
relationship between economic liberization and political competition,
which can be considered as an emergent phenomenon of the complex
socio-economic interaction dynamic.
1 Introduction
Understanding the differences among the rates of industrialization and the
introduction and spreading of technological innovation in different coun-
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tries, possibly leading to economic backwardness in some of them, became
a central issue in economic studies starting from the seminal essay by Ger-
schenkron [15]. In this context a particular focus has been applied on the
role played by political elites, although the relationship between political and
economic perspectives appears still controversial. An interesting hypothesis
on the interplay between political perspectives and possibly economic back-
wardness has been proposed in some papers by Acemoglu and Robinson (see
[3, 2] and references therein). Their model proposes as testing hypothesis
a nonmonotonous relationship between the introduction of technological in-
novation by the incumbent ruler and the level of political competition in the
society. This hypothesis has been statistically tested with positive results
by two of the authors [17] using data on 102 countries over the period 1980
to 2005.
Our project consists in developing a model in the framework of the Ki-
netic Theory for Active Particles (KTAP) [8], which would allow to recover
stylized facts of the model proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson although in
a different mathematical setting and in dynamical conditions. In fact, the
trap cited in our paper’s title refers to the fact that in the AR-model, when
the incumbent rulers find it more convenient to block the introduction of
new technologies in the society, the same will happen again and again in the
future. Our intuitive idea is that our dynamical modelization of the same
phenomenology may find conditions on the model parameters avoiding this
kind of ’trap’.
More precisely, the paper analyses the interplay among the introduction
of technological innovation by an incumbent ruler in a society leading to
citizen income increment, the political support/opposition of the citizens
and the political competition. We cluster the population into three groups
(functional subsystems in KTAP), each population within a group being
homogeneously distributed, i.e. no dependance on the space variable is as-
sumed and the socio-political determinants of each group are represented by
two socio-economic variables. The interactions are modeled using a stochas-
tic game-type approach.
The contents of this paper refers also to a recent contribution regarding
a kinetic model with a bivariate distribution and concerning the modeling of
the interaction of welfare policy and support/opposition to governments [7],
where it is shown that the interactions of two different dynamics can lead to
radicalization of the opposition. A detailed analysis of the role of nonlinear
interactions is proposed in [10], where it is shown how the overall wealth of
a nation can be influenced by different models of social interactions.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. 2 we present the phenomenol-
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ogy of the system that we are going to model and that is based on a complex
dynamic between economy and policy inspired by a model by Acemoglu and
Robinson[3, 2]; in Sec. 3 we introduce the mathematical representation of a
society partitioned into three interacting subsystems such that on each sub-
system two different dynamics take place and without considering migration
among the subsystems. Then, we introduce the specific case modeling the
complex outcomes of the interacting phenomena of economic development
and political policies among three specific groups of interest, individuated
as ruler, citizens and a political competing group, focussing on the compar-
isons between the AR-model and the presented kinetic model. In Sec. 4 we
present a set of numerical solutions in order to test AR-model hypothesis
with the outcomes of the proposed kinetic model. Moreover, we propose
other possible scenarios.
2 Analysing the role of political losers in strategies
of economic development
2.1 Phenomenology description toward a modeling strategy
Political institutions have a direct influence on the economic development of
a society, by means of general economic incentives and reforms. Technolog-
ical innovation is here intended in a broad sense, as clarifyed by Acemoglu
and Robinson: ”enforcement of property rights such as the creation of new
legal institutions or the removal of regulations that prevent productive ac-
tivities” [2]. As already remarked, an important issue regards the dynamics
that possibly leads to the phenomenon of ’blocking’ of economic incentives
and then to economic backwardness in the society. An hypothesis is that
the blocking of technological development is more due to the fear of losing
political power that to fear of losing economic rents and the major point in
analyzing ’blocking’ is in this case the threat that innovation poses to the
political power more than to economic rents [2]. On this path, Acemoglu
and Robinson suggest that the greatest impediment to economic develop-
ment comes not from groups whose economic interests are adversely affected
by economic changes, but from elites whose political power is threatened;
basically from political losers instead than from economic losers. Then,
the effect of economic changes on political power is a key factor in deter-
mining whether technological advances and beneficial economic changes will
be blocked by groups whose political power, more than economic rents, is
eroded. This observation suggests to look more to the determinants of the
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distribution of political power in view of understanding the ’blocking’ con-
ditions. The Austrian-Hungarian historical situation is taken as an example
of the so called ’political replacement effect’ [3]; one may have a significant
view of it in the book ’Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften’ (’The man without
qualities’) by Musil [18]; moreover in Musil’s book we find discussions about
the possibility of analyzing collective phenomena borrowing ideas from sta-
tistical mechanics.
In AR-model three groups are considered, characterized by different av-
eraged quantities: the incumbent ruler, the citizens and a political compet-
ing group. Summarizing, the model focuses on the conditions determining
the blocking of technological innovations, understood in a broad sense, by
means of the ruler; the emerging behavior is represented by the political
replacement effect, i.e. the innovation blocking by means of the political
elites, determined by the fear to lose power. In the following we introduce
the basic parameters of the AR-model.
2.2 Parameters of AR-model and ’blocking’ condition
AR-model is based on the observation that innovation induces ’turbulence’
which may erode the ruler’s power. The complex dynamics involving the
introduction of technological innovation by an incumbent ruler and political
competition is exploited making use of three parameters:
• µ - inverse measure of the level of political competition in the society.
• α - quantifying the effect of the introduction of technological innova-
tion by the ruler on the production.
• γ - quantifying the ’erosion’ of the political power of the incumbent
rulers due to the introduction of new technologies in the society.
The ’blocking’ condition is verified when the payoff of the ruler in the
case in which they do not introduce innovations is bigger than the analogous
value calculated when they innovate. The ’blocking’ condition is obtained
in [3] as
αP
[1
2
+ µ
]
≥ P
[1
2
+ γ µ− (α− 1)
]
(1)
with
P [h] =


0 if h < 0
h if 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
1 if h > 1.
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A central result is the nonmonotonous relationship between the propen-
sity of the ruler to innovate and the political competition in the society, in a
particular range of parameter values. In particular, the authors claim that
the ruler may be induced to not innovate whenever the political competi-
tion in the society takes values in a medium range. For high or low values of
political competition the ruler would always decide to innovate; this result
will be quantified in the following. We define a function F(µ, γ; α) char-
acterizing the introduction of technological innovations by the ruler, called
innovation function:
F(µ, γ; α) = αP
[1
2
+ µ
]
− P
[1
2
+ γ µ− (α− 1)
]
, (2)
with
F(µ, γ; α) : (0,∞) × (1,∞)→ R; (3)
i.e. it is a function depending on the political competition characterized by
µ and the ’turbulence’ due to innovation γ; moreover it is parametrized by
α. It is clear from (1) that the innovation ’blocking’ phenomenon appears
in the range of values for the variables and the parameter, in which the
innovation function is negative; in fact it is in this range of values that it
is more convenient for the incumbent ruler to ’block’ the introduction of
technological innovation with respect to introducing new technologies, com-
paring the respective payoffs. In the following we will discuss numerically
some of these significative values.
2.3 Nonmonotonic relationship between innovation and po-
litical competition
In Fig. 1a, the innovation function F is plotted for α = 1.1. The ’blocking
region’, defined as the domain of the variables such that F < 0, is underlined
in Fig. 1b plotting F for a the same value of α and for γ = 2.
Moreover, we plotted the innovation function for α = 1.167 (Fig.2a) and
α = 3.5 (Fig.3a) and the corresponding plots obtained fixing γ = 2 (Fig.2b
and Fig.3b, respectively).
One observes that the blocking condition is verified only for values of α
near to 1; moreover when α grows the innovation as function of the political
competion loses its nonmonotonicity becoming linear, as one can observe
from Fig. 3. In particular, α = 1.167 corresponds to the minimal parameter
value such that the innovation function doesn’t attain negative values and
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Figure 1: Nonmonotonicity with ’blocking’.
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Figure 2: Nonmonotonicity without ’blocking’.
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Figure 3: Linearity without ’blocking’.
α = 3.5 corresponds to the minimal parameter value such that the innovation
function is linear in µ.
3 Representation of interacting groups of interest
with multiple strategies
3.1 Mathematical structure in the KTAP framework
Following [4] we define some hallmarks as paradigms of our modelling ap-
proach:
• The society is partitioned into functional subsystems, representing
groups of interests.
• In each functional subsystem individuals are called active particles and
share a common strategy represented by an activity variable.
• The activity variable is heterogeneously distributed within each func-
tional subsystem attaining a range of values going from a ”worst” one
to a ”best” one.
• The state of each functional subsystem is described by a probability
distribution on the activity variable.
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• An evolution equation for the probability distribution on each func-
tional subsystem is obtained by a balance of particles in the elementary
volume of the microstates, the inflows and outflows being related to
the defined interactions.
• We assume binary interactions between active particles belonging to
the same fuctional subsystems as well as interactions of active parti-
cles with macroscopic quantities characterizing other functional sub-
systems, characterizing a stream effect.
• Interactions are modeled as stochastic games in which the payoff is
given in probability and are, in general, nonlinearly additive in the
sense that they may depend on the probability distribution itself.
The microstate of each functional subsystem is characterized by a bi-
variate activity variable with two components
{(ui, νr), i = 0, . . . , I; r = 0, . . . , R}. (4)
Both components attain a maximal value, so that they can be normalized
with respect to their respective maximal value. The domain of the activity
variable is Du ×Dν where
Du = {ui =
i
I
, i = 0, . . . , I} ⊂ [0, 1], Dν = {νr =
r
R
, r = 0, . . . , R} ⊂ [0, 1].
A probability mass function is defined on the microstate for each func-
tional subsystem
f sir(t) = f
s(t, ui, νr) : [0, 1] ×Du ×Dν → [0, 1], s = 1, . . . , S (5)
representing the number of active particles that at time t express the strategy
(ui, νr) in the subsystem s; time has been normalized with respect to a
maximal value Tmax assumed to exist. Moreover, it has been assumed that
the number of active particles in each subsystem remains constant during
the evolution, allowing to normalize the distribution with respect to it, so
that the following property applies
I∑
i=0
R∑
r=0
f sir(t) = 1, ∀s = 1, . . . , S, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
The statistical moments of the probability mass function on each functional
subsystem allow us to recover the macroscopic quantities (observables) re-
lated to each functional subsystem. The first-order moments related to the
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marginal probabilities on each functional subsystem are
E
s
ν(t) =
I∑
i=0
R∑
r=0
νrf
s
ir(t), (6)
E
s
u(t) =
R∑
r=0
I∑
i=0
uif
s
ir(t), (7)
s = 1, . . . , S.
The evolution equation for each functional subsystem is obtained by a
balance between the inlet and the outlet of active particles in the elementary
volume of the microstate,
d
dt
f sir(t) = Js[f
s] + Js[f
j ], (8)
with the initial condition (f s)0 = f
s(0), s = 1, . . . , S and j ∈ {0, . . . , s−1, s+
1, . . . S}; moreover we used the notation f s = {f sir}, i = 0, . . . , I, r = 0, . . . , R.
Interactions are modeled as game-type with stochastic payoffs that are spe-
cific for each application and determine the explicit expressions of the fol-
lowing two terms in each subsystem,
• Js[f
s] (s = 0, . . . , S) - accounting for the net flow of active particles
due to binary interactions among active particles belonging to the
same s-th functional subsystem; it may depend on the probability
mass function of the s-th subsystem through its first moments.
• Js[f
j ] (s = 0, . . . , S, j ∈ {0, . . . , s− 1, s+ 1, . . . S}) - accounting for
the net flow of active particles in the s-th subsystem due to the influ-
ence of the the first moments of the j-th subsystem.
In the following we will derive the explicit expressions for the above
introduce flows.
3.2 Linking economic development and political perspectives
In consonance with the specific features of AR-model, let us consider a popu-
lation of individuals subdivided into three functional subsystems: incumbent
ruler, citizens and a political competing group, clustered according to specific
strategies that they express in the analyzed competition. In particular, the
ruler are characterized by their propensity to innovate where innovation has
the meaning of introduction of technological innovation in a broad sense,
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as explained in the previous section. Moreover the ruler are characterized
by their political power. The citizens express their wealth and their political
opinion on the ruler. The competing group is characterized by their wealth
and their political power.
One may summarize the dynamic that we are going to model as in the
following. The propensity to innovate of the incumbent ruler is in a direct
relationship with their political power (more political power, more propen-
sity to innovate) and this propensity determines whether innovation is in-
troduced or not in the society. Whenever innovation is introduced in the
society, a positive increment in the citizens wealth may be probabilistically
obtained as well as in the competing group wealth. Citizens political opinion
is assumed to be driven only by their wealth and citizens opinion directly
influences the political power of the rulers. Analogously, the political power
of the competing group is assumed to depend only on their wealth and it
has a negative return on the political power of the ruler. An intuitive graph-
ical representation of this socio-economic system is given below, where the
minus signs and the red colors represent symbolically negative returns.
+ +
+
+/- -
To explictly model the phenomenology above sketched one has to intro-
duce the transition probabilities, which characterize the probability that has
a candidate particle to switch to a different value of activity variable due to
interactions. Transition probabilities are of two types:
• Dkqhp(s)(νp → νr) - modeling the probability for a candidate particle
with microstate (uh, νp) of the s-th subsystem to change its second
component of the activity variable (νp → νr) due to an interaction
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with a field particle with microstate (uk, νq) of the same subsystem.
Remark 1. By encoding the phenomenology above described of the three
interacting groups of interest, it is assumed that the first component of
the activity variable of the candidate particle do not change due to binary
interactions among active particles of the same subsystem.
• Bjh(s)(uh → ui) - modeling the probability that has a candidate parti-
cle of the s-th subsystem to change its first component of the activity
variable (uh → ui) due to the influence of the first-order moments of
the j-th subsystem (s = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3 with j 6= s).
Remark 2. By encoding the phenomenology above described of the three
interacting groups of interest, it is assumed that the second component
of the activity variable of the candidate particle do not change due to the
influence of subsystems different with respect to the one to which the particle
belongs.
Each subsystem representing ruler, citizens and competing group respec-
tively is indexed as explained in the following; moreover the activity variable
for each of them and the interactions are modeled.
1. Subsystem 1. Ruler
Microstate:
{
political power (ui, i = 1, . . . , I)
propensity to innovate (νr, r = 0, . . . , R)
Interactions within the subsystem:
It is assumed that the propensity to innovate of the ruler is influenced
by their political power. In particular, if the ruler have a high mean
political power, their propensity to introduce innovation in the society
may rise, in probability. The opposite is assumed if the ruler have a
low mean political power.
The above sketched phenomenology is encoded in the following tran-
sition probabilities which make use of uniform probability mass func-
tions:
• if E1u ≥
1
2
,
∀k, q, Dkqhp(1)(νp → νr) =


0 for r ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
1
R−p+1
for r ∈ {p, . . . , R}
(9)
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• if E1u <
1
2
,
∀k, q, Dkqhp(1)(νp → νr) =


1
p
for r ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
0 for r ∈ {p, . . . , R}
(10)
(in both cases above the transition probabilities are independent
on the values of νk and νq).
Influences of the other subsystems:
It is assumed that the political opinion of the citizens influences the
political power of the ruler. In particular, if the citizens have an high
mean political opinion, the politcal power of the ruler may rise, in
probability. The opposite is assumed if the citizens have a low mean
political opinion.
The above sketched phenomenology is encoded in the following tran-
sition probabilities which make use of uniform probability mass func-
tions:
• if E2ν ≥
1
2
,
B2h(1)(uh → ui) =


0 for i ∈ {0, . . . , h− 1}
1
I−h+1
for i ∈ {h, . . . , I}
(11)
• if E2ν <
1
2
,
B2h(1)(uh → ui) =


1
h
for i ∈ {0, . . . , h− 1}
0 for i ∈ {h, . . . , I}
(12)
Actually, it is assumed that the political power of the competing group
influences the political power of the ruler. In particular, if the compet-
ing group has a high mean political power, the political power of the
ruler may decrease, in probability. If the competing group has a low
mean political power, it is assumed that there is no influence on the
political power of the citizens. The above sketched phenomenology is
encoded in the following transition probabilities:
• if E3ν ≥
1
2
,
B3h(1)(uh → ui) = γ˜δi,h−1 + (1− γ˜)δi,h (13)
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• if E3ν <
1
2
,
B3h(1)(uh → ui) = δh,i (14)
In the above equations and hereafter δh,k represents the Kronecker
delta.
2. Subsystem 2. Citizens
Microstate:
{
wealth (ui, i = 0, . . . , I)
political opinion (νr, r = 0, . . . , R)
Interactions within the subsystem:
It is assumed that the opinion dynamic of citizens is driven by eco-
nomic motivations: when two active particles interact, if the wealth
status of the candidate particle is below the one of the field particle,
the candidate particle has a probability to acquire the opinion of the
field one, following an imitation rule. If, on the contrary, the wealth
status of the candidate particle is above or equal to the one of the field
particle, the candidate one will not change his opinion. The following
transition probabilities encodes the above described phenomenology:
• if uh < uk,
D
kq
hp
(2)(νp → νr) = β δr,q + (1− β)δr,p (15)
• if uh ≥ uk,
D
kq
hp
(1)(νp → νr) = δr,p (16)
where β is a parameter of the model.
Influences of the other subsystems:
We model the impact of the introduction of technological innovations
on the citizen income by simply reasoning that if the ruler introduces
technological innovation, the citizens may rise their wealth status. In
particular, if the ruler an high mean propensity to innovate, the wealth
of the citizens may rise, in probability. If the ruler have a low mean
propensity to innovate, it is assumed that there is no influence on the
wealth of the citizens. The above sketched phenomenology is encoded
in the following transition probabilities:
We model this effect by assuming that the ruler may have a positive re-
turn on the wealth of the citizens depending on the mean value of their
propensity to innovate (E1ν). The transition probabilities encoding the
above described phenomenology are the following,
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• if E1ν ≥
1
2
,
B1h(2)(uh → ui) = α˜ δi,h+1 + (1− α˜)δi,h (17)
• if E1ν <
1
2
,
B1h(2)(uh → ui) = δh,i (18)
3. Subsystem 3. Competing group
Microstate:
{
wealth (ui, i = 0, . . . , I)
political power (νr, r = 0, . . . , R)
Interactions within the subsystem:
It is assumed that the political power of the competing group is in-
fluenced by their wealth. In particular, if the competing group has a
high mean wealth, their political power may rise, in probability. The
opposite is assumed if the competing group have a low mean wealth.
The above sketched phenomenology is encoded in the following tran-
sition probabilities which make use of uniform probability mass func-
tions:
• if E3u ≥
1
2
,
∀k, q, Dkqhp(3)(νp → νr) =


0 for r ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
1
R−p+1
for r ∈ {p, . . . , R}
(19)
• if E3u <
1
2
,
∀k, q, Dkqhp(3)(νp → νr) =


1
p
for r ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
0 for r ∈ {p, . . . , R}
(20)
(in both cases above the transition probabilities are independent
on the values of νk and νq).
Influence of the other subsystems:
We model the impact of the introduction of technological innovations
on the competing group income too by simply reasoning, as in the case
of the citizens, that if the ruler introduces technological innovation, the
competing group may rise their wealth status, analogously to the case
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of the citizens. In particular, if the ruler a high mean propensity to
innovate, the wealth of the competing group may rise, in probability.
If the ruler have a low mean propensity to innovate, it is assumed
that there is no influence on the wealth of the competing group. The
above sketched phenomenology is encoded in the following transition
probabilities:
• if E1ν ≥
1
2
B1h(3)(uh → ui) =


0 for i ∈ {0, . . . , h− 1}
1
I−h+1
for i ∈ {h, . . . , I}
(21)
• if E1ν <
1
2
B1h(3)(uh → ui) = δh,i (22)
In order to derive the explicit expressions for the flows of eq.(8) and then
the kinetic model with stochastic game-type interactions, we need also to
introduce the frequency of binary interactions of the candidate particle with
the field particle (regarding the dynamic within each subsystem) or with
first-order moments of other subsystems. The frequency of interactions are
also called encounter rates; in particular:
• ηs - encounter rate within the s-th subsystem, i.e. the frequency of
interactions of the candidate particle with the field particle within the
same subsystem (s = 1, 2, 3). We adopt a constant rate of interactions
within each subsystem.
• µjs - encounter rate among the subsystems, i.e. the frequency of inter-
actions of the candidate particle of the s-th subsystem with the first
order moments of the j-th subsystem (s, j = 1, 2, 3, j 6= s). We adopt
a constant rate of interactions between each couple of interacting func-
tional subsystems.
We are ready now to derive the explicit forms of the flows of eq.(8) by
balancing the inflow and the outflow of active particles in the elementary
volume of the microstate:
Js[f
s] =
I∑
h,k=0
R∑
p,q=0
ηsD
kq
hp(s)(νp → νr)f
s
hp f
s
kq−f
s
ir
I∑
k=0
R∑
q=0
ηs f
s
kq, (23)
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Js[f
j ] =
3∑
j = 1
j 6= s
{ I∑
h=0
R∑
p=0
[
µjs B
j
h(s)(uh → ui)f
s
hp
]
− µjsf
s
ir
}
, (24)
for s = 1, 2, 3.
Remark 3. The parameter µ, quantifying the inverse of the political com-
petition can be compared to the first moment with respect to the political
power of the competing group, then it is given by E3ν .
Remark 4. The parameter α, quantifying the effect of the introduction of
technological innovation in AR-model, can be compared to the α˜ present
in eq.(17) which quantifies the effect of the introduction of technological
innovation by the ruler on the wealth of citizens .
Remark 5. The parameter γ of AR-model, quantifying the ’erosion’ of the
political power of the incumbent ruler due to the introduction of new tech-
nologies in the society, can be compared to the parameter γ˜, which quantifies
the effect of the political power of the competing group on the political power
of the ruler.
4 Numerical solutions and critical analysis
In the numerical solutions the parameters of the transition probabilities take
the values of Tab. 1.
Parameter Meaning Value
α˜ scales the positive return on the citizen wealth 0.1
β citizen susceptibility to change opinion 0.3
γ˜ scales the negative return on the political power
of the competing group
0.9
Table 1: Parameters involved in the transition probabilities.
All the encounter rates are settled as 1.
Case Study I - Strong ruler with weak political competing group:
nonmonotonous relationship between political competion and propen-
sity to innovate of the ruler. We assume as initial condition a strong
16
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Figure 4: Initial conditions on the three functional subsystems.
ruler Fig.(4)a and a weak competing group Fig.(4)c, whilst the wealth and
political opinion of the citizens are homogeneously distributed (4)b.
In Fig.(5) it is reported the evolution of the first order moments referred
to the propensity to innovate of the ruler (blue), the political power of the
competing group (green) and the citizen wealth (black).
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Figure 5: Evolutions of the propensity of the ruler to innovate (E1ν), citizen
wealth (E2u) and political power of the competing group (E
3
ν) in a society
with strong ruler and weak opposition
Fig.(6) shows the nonmonotonous relationship between the propensity
to innovate of the ruler and the political power of the competing group.
The general observed trends are conserved also if one changes the initial
distribution of wealth and political opinion of the citizens.
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Figure 6: Propensity to innovate of the ruler (E1ν) vs. political power of the
competing group (E3ν) in a society with strong ruler and weak opposition.
Case study II - Strong ruler with strong political opposition.
We show emergent behaviors when a ruler with strong political power
acts in a society with a high level of political competition. The wealth
and political opinion of the citizen are taken as homogeneously distributed;
however the general trends are conserved as the initial distribution on the
citizens changes.
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Figure 7: Evolutions of the propensity of the ruler to innovate (E1ν), citizen
wealth (E2u) and political power of the competing group (E
3
ν) in a society
with a strong rule and a strong political competition.
The tendency to introduce innovation of the ruler increases (Fig.7).
When analysing the propensity to innovate of the ruler vs. the political
power of the competing group it is observed that the propensity to innovate
is always increasing whilst the political power of the competing group is
decreasing in a first interval and then it is increasing. So there is a non-
monotonous relationship of the political power of the competing group vs.
the propensity to innovate of the ruler.
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Figure 8: Propensity to innovate of the ruler (E1ν) vs. the political power
of the competing group (E3ν) in a society with strong ruler and strong op-
position.
The general observed trends are conserved also if one changes the initial
distribution of wealth and political opinion of the citizens.
Case study III - Weak ruler with strong opposition. We show
emergent behaviors when a ruler with weak political power acts in a society
with a strong level of political competition.
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Figure 9: Evolutions of the propensity of the ruler to innovate (E1ν), citizen
wealth (E2u) and political power of the competing group (E
3
ν) in a society
with weak ruler and strong opposition
In this situation the tendency of the ruler to introduce innovation de-
creases (Fig.9) and the relationship between the propensity of the ruler to
innovate and the political power of the competing group is monotonous
(Fig.10).
The general observed trends are conserved also if one changes the initial
distribution of wealth and political opinion of the citizens.
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Figure 10: Propensity to innovate of the ruler (E1ν) vs. political power
of the competing group (E3ν) in a society with weak ruler and strong
opposition
Case study IV - Balanced political power of the ruler and the
competing group in a poor society and in a rich society. In
this case study we consider the case of a society with medium political
power both for the ruler and the competing group. We show that the time
evolution of the mean value of propensity to introduce innovation of the
ruler and political power of the competing group are dependent on the initial
distribution of citizen wealth.
One observes that when the political power of the ruler and that of
the competing group are balanced, the propensity to innovate of the ruler
tends to decrease in the case of a poor society (Fig.11 on the left) whilst it
tends to increase in a wealthy society (Fig.11 on the right). In both cases a
monotonous relationship between the propensity of the ruler to innovate and
the political power of the competing group is observed (Fig.12 and Fig.13,
respectively).
-
Case study V: Sensitivity to the initial conditions of the ratios
between first order moments. Let us finally consider the time evolution
of the ratios between some of the first-order moments.
Let us define the following quantities:
F (t) =
E
1
u
E3ν
=
ruler political power
competing political power
and the propensity to innovate of the ruler and the political power of the
competing group
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Figure 11: Case study IV: Evolutions of the propensity of the ruler to inno-
vate (E1ν), citizen wealth (E
2
u) and political power of the competing group
(E3ν) in a society with balanced political power of the ruler and the
competing group in a poor society (left) and in a rich society (right).
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Figure 12: Propensity of the ruler to innovate vs. political power of the
competing group in a poor society.
G(t) =
E
1
ν
E3ν
=
ruler propensity to innovate
competing political power
with the scope to explore the sensitivity to the initial conditions for both
cases.
Again, simulations are performed with parameters α˜ = 0.1, β = 0.3
and γ˜ = 0.9, and we seek for emergent behaviours while varying initial
conditions. In particular, different values of F (0) and G(0) are obtained by
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Figure 13: Propensity of the ruler to innovate vs. political power of the
competing group in a wealthy society.
initially clustering rulers and political opponents in different activity groups,
while citizens are assumed to have a uniform initial distribution in all cases.
Results are shown in Fig. 14. We can see that even for opposite initial
conditions, G(t) shows a trend to an asymptotic value near to 1, that is the
propensity to innovate of the ruler tends to be equilibrated by the compet-
ing group’s political power. An analogous result is observed for F (t), that
compares both groups’ political power, that shows a trend to a value near
to 0.8. These results show that when the ruler are politically weaker than
the competing group, they are able to surpass it for some time but, after
a while, their political power decreases again. This behaviour looks very
interesting and a suitable explanation should be found.
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Figure 14: Evolution of the quantities F (t) (left) and G(t) (right)
5 Conclusions and perspectives
The differences in economic policies and political institutions is a central
issue in political economy, tending to clarify the mechanics of cross-country
income differences. Some evidences from the US can be found in [9]. Ace-
22
moglu and Robinson argued that the incumbent ruler is in power being
selected as a good match for the actual ’environment’ but, due to the in-
troduction of innovations, the environment changes decreasing the ruler’s
advantage and inducing a mechanism that may led to ’blocking’ of the po-
litical reforms.
In the present paper we propose a kinetic model where interactions are
modeled as stochastic games; three groups characterized by different strate-
gies (ruler, citizens and a political competing group) evolve by rules internal
within each group and, at the same time, being influenced by the dynamics
and evolutions of the other groups. A set of numerical solutions is obtained
in order to analyse the conditions determining the nonmonotonous rela-
tionship between the propensity of the ruler to innovate and the political
competition of the society conjectured by AR-model.
An interesting development consists in considering an external action,
which is a development of the basic AR-model in [3] and is represented by
the effect of an external threat on the society. In [3] it is showed that the
blocking region, resulting in a parameter range of values is, in that case,
significatively reduced.
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